is largely dependent on managerial judgment and uses minimal mathematics or computer time. Despite simplicity it is an elegant technique for ensuring process performance, like many other management techniques originating from Japan, FMEA requires team-based thinking and a mutual belief in collective responsibility. The success of this method therefore rests largely upon the behavioural-motivational aspects of the people involved in the process.
Setting up cross-functional teams
The technique is common-sensical. All that need be done is to consider all the possible modes of failure for a system. Any system can be studied as an input-output combination of four major factors, viz. man, machine, materials and measurements.
These can be further broken down into sub-systems, e.g. man (motivation, skills, numbers), machine (components, technology, design), materials (input-output logistics, raw materials), and measurements (instruments, human element, and standards). This process of discovery of failure modes is usually done through brainstorming sessions by several cross-functional groups. The modes are then successively broken down into first level causes, second level causes and so on. Generally, the team limits the cause-effect chain analysis to a few important failure modes identified through the Pareto technique.
It is important to understand that a process-system is defined by the involved team, rather than by any top-management or "outside 1 agencies. This constraint ensures that the system-boundaries are flexible so that the team may define its working parameters itself. The reason for creating cross-functional teams is obvious. No individual system, no matter how much experienced and closely defined it is, can ever be one hundred percent self-sufficient with regard to knowing, understanding and fulfilling the needs of different functional areas on its own. The success of the technique depends upon the correct assessment of all the possible failure modes, and therefore the need for having relevant expertise on board for the different sub-systems cannot be overemphasized.
Defining flexible system boundaries
In a cause-effect chain, the most difficult task often is to identify the beginning and end. problem of a heat reactor failure. It was found that the reactor had failed because of overheating of the cooling water the temperature of which was regulated by a safety valve. The safety valve had failed because the periodic maintenance required for it was neglected. Mandatory maintenance was neglected because of unclear employee responsibility structures. Employee role accountability was poor because of low employee motivation which in turn was due to poor management-staff relations. In such a judgmental scenario, there cannot be hard rules. This is a fuzzy area requiring consensus, experience, and a holistic approach towards problems.
Failure mode * frequency * severity ratings
After all the failure cause-chain has been identified for a given mode, further brainstorming should be done for creating a hierarchy of failures based on their cost to the organization. Some of the failure states may simply be unacceptable and some may be tolerable. An aircraft engine failure would be unacceptable, whereas non-latching of a passenger's seat-belt may pass in the short-term.
Once the wcightagcs to all the failure modes have been established, the team must embark upon a cost-benefit exercise for the control systems required at various levels of the cause-effect chain. Going back to the problem of heat reactor failure, the team may decide at the first level to redesign the safety valve such that it does not require any maintenance, or it may lay a set of safety valves based on different technologies so that failure of one valve can be checked by another. Or a special post may be created for verifying the maintenance code is adhered to by the concerned staff. At the secondlevel, it may be felt more worthwhile to talk to the demotivated employees and redress their problems. A systematic approach is to draw a eolumnized table (see Table 1 The fourth column contains a detection-rating on another 10-point scale (1 signifying "easily predictable* much before the actual failure occurs and 10 denoting a failure mode which is "impossible to detect 1 till after its occurrence). The scores in each row across the three rating columns are now multiplied to give a danger-rating to the failure mode (Table 1) . 2) FMEA, as might have been observed, is a labour-intensive process and therefore expensive. The conventional approaches therefore are sought to be replaced by more form-based and knowledge-based concepts.
3) Extensive data of the existing system is often necessary for a thorough analysis. Often for very complex projects, the conventional approach to FMEA may be unfeasible for the sheer size of the failure mode and the chains generated.
4) Top-management commitment to the process is necessary for sustained periods. This is often difficult since there are no tangible solutions but only problems (failure causes).
In the initial stages the presence of an external consultant facilitates the difficult process of team integration.
5) The conventional FMEA method is weak for the purpose of organizational learning.
Computer programmes have been developed which permit on-line cataloguing and record of the fault lines, potential weak areas, and suggested control measures (Harmon & Sawyer, 1990 ).
6) Often the team exercises judgment about the severity of the causes just to limit the number of alternatives being generated. This creative approach, though useful, may lead to sub-optimal choices.
7) It is author's experience that team members used to hardcore quantitative approaches and computer-based heuristics are uncomfortable with FMEA. It would have been observed that each sub-process of this technique appears quite subjective, however in reality it is not 8) Often, after a brainstorming session it may be felt that no dramatic or useful results have been achieved. This is generally due to the system boundaries being defined too rigidly. The boundaries should be loosely defined such that any possible cause could be broken down till a point is reached where the organization can no longer profitably exercise control
A recapitulation of the FMEA technique
To summarize, the FMEA process involves: 1) TEAMS: Forming a cross-functional team with participation of senior executives, supervisory staff, skilled workers, and sometimes suppliers.
2) DETECTION: Identification of all possible failure modes. Use of Pareto principle to limit the number of failure modes to manageable numbers.
3) ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS: Clubbing of the various failure modes to arrive at a list of mutually exclusive modes.
4) RATING:
Rating the failure modes on three scales of severity of failure, frequency of occurrence, and chance of detection.
5) CUT-OFF POINT:
The team has to establish a cut-off danger point.
6) COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS:
The modes above the cut-off point must be taken up and checked for the changes that are needed in the existing controls to pull down the danger score of the mode to below the cut off. 7) ITERATIVE RERATING: All the modes for which new level of controls have been installed must be rerated and the benefits of the new control systems in relation to the costs be decided. Iterate the process till all the modes are below the danger level.
8) TIME-BOUND ACTION PLAN: A time-bound action plan must be set up to implement the changes proposed during the analysis.
